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Bigger Isn’t Always Better: An Analysis 
of Court Efficiency Using Hierarchical 
Linear Modeling 
 
Teresa Dalton
*
 and Jordan M. Singer† 
 
One important measure of trial court efficiency is overall case 
length—that is, the elapsed time from a case’s initial filing to its final 
disposition. Using a large, recent dataset from nearly 7000 federal civil 
cases, we find that two variables are particularly useful in predicting 
overall case length: the total number of attorneys filing an appearance in 
the case, and the number of authorized judgeships for a given district 
court.  Further, we find a significant and surprising interaction between 
these two variables, indicating that smaller courts are more efficient 
than larger courts at processing civil cases when more than three 
attorneys appear in a case, but that the opposite holds true when three 
attorneys or fewer appear in a case. 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The efficient resolution of disputes has long been a central goal of 
the American civil justice system.  All else being equal, the speedier 
resolution of cases promotes better financial certainty and psychological 
closure for litigants, as well as more manageable dockets for judges.  By 
contrast, delay in civil cases is frequently associated with higher costs
1
 
and reduced value of judgments.
2
  In light of these realities, the 
 
* Department of Criminology, Law and Society, University of California, Irvine. Ph.D. 
Quantitative Research Methods, University of Denver.  J.D., University of Denver. 
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The research for this article was initiated while both authors were at the University of 
Denver.  We are grateful to the Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal 
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to participants at the Tenth Hawaii International Conference on Social Sciences for 
helpful comments on earlier drafts. 
1. See Michael Heise, Justice Delayed? An Empirical Analysis of Civil Case 
Disposition Time, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 813, 814 & n.8 (2000). 
2. See, e.g., George Priest, Private Litigants and the Court Congestion Problem, 69 
B.U. L. REV. 527, 534 (1989). 
1
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importance of timely civil case processing has been codified in federal 
legislation,
3
 court rules,
4
 and internal court procedures.
5
 
A widespread commitment to timely case resolutions, however, has 
not translated into uniform results.  Despite the efforts of researchers, 
court personnel, and even Congress to identify and address sources of 
delay in the civil justice system, consistent and efficient case processing 
in the federal district courts remains remarkably elusive.  Average 
disposition times still vary widely from district court to district court, 
even for the same type of case.
6
  Moreover, most of the seminal studies 
of delay are decades old.  Additional research and analysis is needed. 
We offer a modest but important contribution to the collective 
understanding of civil case processing times, using a recent, large, and 
detailed data set drawn from approximately 6700 closed cases in seven 
federal district courts.  We employ a multilevel modeling technique 
known as hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) to capture and evaluate the 
relationship between the overall length of a case and a variety of 
variables attendant to the case. 
Our analysis yields two surprising conclusions.  First, we find a 
relationship between the overall length of a civil case, the size of the 
federal district court where it is pending (as measured by the number of 
authorized district judges), and the total number of attorneys who filed an 
appearance in the case.  Put differently, the length of a civil case can be 
predicted by the number of district judges on the court and the number of 
attorneys appearing in the case.  Second, and even more intriguing, we 
find that larger and smaller courts switch in relative efficiency as the 
number of attorneys in a case grows.  Specifically, in cases in which 
three or fewer total attorneys have filed an appearance, larger courts are 
predicted to process the case faster than do smaller courts.  Conversely, 
 
3. See Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 103(a), 104 Stat. 
5093 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 476 (2012)). 
4. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (stating that the entire body of rules shall “be construed and 
administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action 
and proceeding.”). 
5. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U. S., THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990 
FINAL REPORT: ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS FOR REDUCTION OF COST AND DELAY 
ASSESSMENT OF PRINCIPLES, GUIDELINES & TECHNIQUES 3-4 (1997). 
6. See, e.g., INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., CIVIL CASE 
PROCESSING IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ANALYSIS 28-
29 (2009) [hereinafter CIVIL CASE PROCESSING] (noting differences in mean and median 
time to disposition in selected district courts for common federal cases, including Civil 
Rights – Employment cases and “Other Civil Rights” cases). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/5
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in cases in which more than three total attorneys have filed an 
appearance, smaller courts are more efficient.  Below, we detail our 
methodology and findings, and offer some preliminary observations. 
 
II.   Background to the Study 
 
Most studies of trial court efficiency have operated as inquiries into 
caseflow management, a technique for reducing delays by carefully 
managing the time between major events in the life of a case.  The 
heyday of caseflow management research occurred from the mid-1970s 
to the mid-1980s, when then-Chief Justice Warren Burger made efficient 
civil case processing a key component of his vision for the American 
judicial system.
7
  Between 1977 and 1990, researchers from the Federal 
Judicial Center,
8
 National Center for State Courts,
9
 and the RAND 
Institute for Civil Justice
10
 published studies on case processing in 
federal and state courts.  These studies focused on the time between 
events in the life of a case, such as the number of days from case filing to 
the close of discovery, or the number of days a court took to rule on a 
motion.  These studies also introduced metrics that allowed, for the first 
time, comparisons across different judges and courts. No efforts, 
however, were made to provide predictive models. 
 
7. Chief Justice Burger’s interest in the application of modern business 
administration methods to the courts spanned his entire career on the United States 
Supreme Court.   See, e.g., Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Remarks on the State of the 
Federal Judiciary (Aug. 10, 1970), in HOWARD JAMES, CRISIS IN THE COURTS (1971), at 
iv; Warren E. Burger, Introduction to Symposium, Reducing the Costs of Civil Litigation, 
37 RUTGERS L. REV. 217 (1985). 
8. See, e.g., PAUL R. CONNOLLY ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., JUDICIAL CONTROLS 
AND THE CIVIL LITIGATIVE PROCESS: DISCOVERY (1978); PAUL R. CONNOLLY & PATRICIA 
A. LOMBARD, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND THE CIVIL LITIGATIVE 
PROCESS: MOTIONS (1980); STEVEN FLANDERS ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., CASE 
MANAGEMENT AND COURT MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 
(1977). 
9. See, e.g., THOMAS CHURCH, JR. ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, JUSTICE 
DELAYED: THE PACE OF LITIGATION IN URBAN TRIAL COURTS (1978); JOHN GOERDT ET 
AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING COURT DELAY: THE PACE OF LITIGATION 
IN 26 URBAN TRIAL COURTS, 1987 (1989); BARRY MAHONEY ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR 
STATE COURTS, CHANGING TIMES IN TRIAL COURTS (1988); LARRY L. SIPES ET AL., NAT’L 
CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, MANAGING TO REDUCE DELAY (1980). 
10. See, e.g., TERENCE DUNGWORTH & NICHOLAS M. PACE, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL 
JUSTICE, STATISTICAL OVERVIEW OF CIVIL LITIGATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (1990); 
PATRICIA A. EBENER, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, COURT EFFORTS TO REDUCE 
PRETRIAL DELAY: A NATIONAL INVENTORY (1980). 
3
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Formal studies of case processing and delay prevention were soon 
joined by legislative enactments.  In 1990, Congress passed the Civil 
Justice Reform Act (CJRA), which required each federal district court to 
develop a civil justice expense and delay reduction plan.
11
  The CJRA set 
out six preferred case management techniques,
12
 and required that ten 
pilot districts implement the techniques for further study.
13
  In 1996, the 
RAND Institute for Civil Justice reported the results of the CJRA pilot, 
concluding that the preferred techniques as implemented had little effect 
on overall case length.
14
  The RAND study would represent the last 
major civil case processing study for more than a decade. 
In 2009, a major new study of civil case processing was issued by 
the Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System at the 
University of Denver (IAALS).  The study examined the dockets of 
nearly 7700 cases in eight federal district courts, all of which were 
terminated between October 1, 2005 and September 30, 2006.
15
  The 
study focused on the time between events in the life of a civil case, 
including the overall time from filing to disposition.
16
  Consistent with 
earlier caseflow management literature, the IAALS study concluded 
generally that lowering overall time to disposition “does not appear to be 
a matter of addressing one or two specific pretrial practices, but rather 
striving to improve the time between events at every stage of the case.”17  
While the IAALS study amassed extensive structural data on each case 
(such as the number of parties and attorneys on each side, number and 
type of motions filed, and identity of the presiding judge(s)), it did not 
explicitly examine the relationship between these data and the overall 
length of a case.
18
 
Collectively, these studies and others like them have spawned an 
extensive literature offering delay prevention strategies and techniques 
 
11. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5090 (codified 
at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (2012)). 
12. Id. § 473. 
13. Id. § 477. 
14. See generally JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE 
REFORM ACT IN PILOT AND COMPARISON DISTRICTS (1996); see also JAMES S. KAKALIK ET 
AL., JUST, SPEEDY, AND INEXPENSIVE? AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT 
UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT (1996). 
15. CIVIL CASE PROCESSING, supra note 6, at 2. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. at 9. 
18. See id. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/5
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for courts and judges at both the federal and state level.
19
  But the 
primary focus of these studies has been on the management of individual 
events in the life of case, rather than structural factors outside of a 
judge’s control that nevertheless may influence case length.  Our 
objective here is to examine these broader structural relationships, using 
the same rich data set compiled for the recent IAALS study. 
 
III. Study Methodology 
 
As noted above, the cases used in the present study were selected 
from a data set compiled by IAALS for the purposes of a larger civil case 
management study.
20
  Researchers at IAALS initially selected fifteen 
United States District Courts for possible analysis. The fifteen courts 
were chosen to reflect diversity of size (as measured by the 
Congressionally authorized number of district judges),
21
 geography, and 
national ranking in judicial caseload profiles, based on publicly available 
Federal Caseload Management Statistics.  With respect to the latter 
category, courts are ranked based on, among other things, their median 
times from filing to disposition of civil cases.
22
  IAALS selected courts 
 
19. See, e.g., CIVIL CASE PROCESSING, supra note 6; COMM. ON COURT ADMIN. & 
CASE MGMT., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.,  CIVIL LITIGATION MANAGEMENT 
MANUAL (2001); ROBERT J. NIEMIC ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., GUIDE TO JUDICIAL 
MANAGEMENT OF CASES IN ADR (2001); DAVID RAUMA & DONNA STIENSTRA, FED. 
JUDICIAL CTR., THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLANS: 
A SOURCEBOOK (1995); WILLIAM W. SCHWARZER & ALAN HIRSCH, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., 
THE ELEMENTS OF CASE MANAGEMENT: A POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES (2d ed. 2006); 
DAVID C. STEELMAN ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, CASEFLOW MANAGEMENT: 
THE HEART OF COURT MANAGEMENT IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM (2000). 
20. The results of the study are reported in CIVIL CASE PROCESSING, supra note 6.   
While drawing from the same data set as the study in this article, the IAALS report 
examines more cases overall and addresses specific case management practices in depth. 
21. Each federal district court is authorized by Congress to have a certain number of 
full-time district judges.  See 28 U.S.C. § 133 (2012).  In addition, each court may control 
its caseload through the use of magistrate judges (appointed for terms pursuant to Article 
I of the Constitution), senior judges (district judges who have taken senior status and 
have substantial discretion over the type and volume of their caseloads), and visiting 
judges (who are assigned to another district but preside over specific cases).  The number 
of authorized judgeships per district is intended in part to be reflective of the district’s 
caseload.  See Erwin C. Surrency, Federal District Court Judges and the History of Their 
Courts, 40 F.R.D. 139, 151 (1967). 
22. See Federal Court Management Statistics, U. S. COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/fcmstat/index.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2014).  The Federal 
Court Management Statistics are updated as of September 30 of each calendar year.  The 
IAALS study used the statistics ending September 30, 2006, which reflect the  twelve-
5
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with a wide range of national rankings in this category. All fifteen courts 
were contacted to request a fee waiver for access to publicly available 
case dockets through the federal courts’ electronic PACER interface.23  
Ten of the fifteen courts granted the waiver, and eight of those ten courts 
were eventually selected for inclusion in the IAALS database.
24
 
The research in this article is based on data from over 6700 cases in 
seven of the courts selected for the IAALS study—the United States 
District Courts for the District of Arizona, District of Colorado, District 
of Idaho, Eastern District of Missouri, District of Oregon, Eastern 
District of Virginia, and Western District of Wisconsin.
25
 The data 
pertain to all civil cases in those seven districts that closed during the 
one-year period from October 1, 2005 to September 30, 2006, with 
limited exceptions.
26
  The data were drawn exclusively from electronic 
case dockets available through the PACER system. 
Drawing from the IAALS database, this Article uses the number of 
Congressionally authorized district judges as a surrogate measure for 
court size under the assumption that judicial allocation was appropriate 
for caseload. We do not account specifically for senior or visiting judges, 
although we note that virtually every district court in the study was 
 
month period during which the cases in the study were terminated or otherwise closed. 
23. Public access to federal court dockets is available through the Public Access to 
Court Electronic Records system (PACER) at a set cost per page viewed.  At the time of 
data collection, this cost was set at eight cents per page.  See PACER User Manual for 
ECF Courts, PACER PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT ELECTRONIC RECORDS, 2, available at 
http://www.pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/documents/pacermanual.pdf (last updated Jan. 2006).  
This charge applies to search results even if the search yields no matches.  See id.  
Although the charge for any one search or document view was capped at $2.40 – the cost 
of thirty pages – the cumulative charge for viewing the docket sheet, motions and 
pleadings necessary to complete the study would have quickly totaled tens of thousands 
of dollars.  IAALS has expressed its gratitude to each district court that granted a waiver 
to allow it to develop its dataset without incurring a substantial financial burden. 
24. CIVIL CASE PROCESSING, supra note 6, at 20-21. 
25. One small court in the IAALS study was not selected for this study in order to 
assure an equal balance of small and large courts. 
26. The IAALS database excluded certain categories of cases with unusual 
procedural postures, specifically student loan cases, recovery of overpayment and 
enforcement of judgments, recovery of overpayment of veterans’ benefits, forfeiture 
cases, social security cases, and prisoner petitions. In addition, a random sample of 
approximately 400 cases each was taken from the District of Arizona and the Eastern 
District of Virginia because the sheer number of closed cases in those districts was 
prohibitively high for full data entry.  A probability sampling scheme was implemented 
for closed cases in these two districts. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/5
  
2014] Bigger Isn’t Always Better 1175 
 
assisted by their contributions during the time period reviewed.
27
  Nor do 
we expressly account for vacant judgeship months, which affected one 
district during the relevant timeframe.
28
  It is not a focus of this Article to 
ascertain if the various courts have the appropriate number of sitting 
judges, but rather if the number of judges assigned by statute has an 
effect on the overall efficiency of the courts as measured by the length of 
cases from date of filing to date of disposition (case length). The data 
were drawn from two small courts (with two authorized district judges 
each), three courts of medium size (with six or seven authorized district 
judges each) and two large courts (with eleven and twelve authorized 
district judges, respectively). 
The overall length of the case, as measured from filing to 
disposition, was chosen as the dependent variable for this study.  We 
selected this variable for a number of reasons. First, and most 
fundamentally, overall case length is an available measure in every case.  
By contrast, focusing on the presence of specific procedural events, such 
as summary judgment or trial, would eliminate a large number of cases 
that settle or otherwise terminate without reaching the dispositive motion 
or trial phase.  Second, while overall time to disposition alone cannot 
adequately capture information about satisfaction with the federal 
judicial system, it is one component in measuring satisfaction, and for 
many a rather important one.
29
  Protracted litigation strains court 
resources,
30
 places financial burdens on litigants,
31
 results in increasingly 
devalued judgments,
32
 increases the likelihood of faded memories and 
 
27. CIVIL CASE PROCESSING, supra note 6, App. G. 
28. Judicial Caseload Profile, Eastern District of Virginia 2006, U.S. COURTS, 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/cmsd2006.pl. 
29. By this, we do not mean to suggest that case length itself is an adequate proxy 
for justice. A just result in any case, civil or criminal, must take into account not only the 
time it took to resolve the dispute, but also the financial (and physical and emotional) cost 
to the litigants, completeness of the legal analysis and application in conformity with 
established law at every stage of the case and adequate safeguards for procedural due 
process.  See Hon. William G. Young & Jordan M. Singer, Bench Presence: Toward a 
More Complete Model of Federal District Court Productivity, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 55, 
75 (2013) (arguing that court productivity must account for the efficiency, accuracy, and 
procedural fairness of adjudication). 
30. See Larry L. Sipes, Reducing Delay in State Courts—A March Against Folly, 37 
RUTGERS L. REV. 299, 299 (1985). 
31. See, e.g., Jonathan Fischbach & Michael Fischbach, Rethinking Optimality in 
Tort Litigation: The Promise of Reverse Cost-Shifting, 19 BYU J. PUB. L. 317, 320 
(2005). 
32. See, e.g., Patrick Johnston, Civil Justice Reform: Juggling Between Politics and 
7
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stale evidence,
33
 and prevents psychological closure.
34
  Some courts are 
simply better at resolving cases more quickly and we look to what these 
courts have in common. 
At the individual case level, this study considered many variables 
that may have been associated with overall case length.  These variables 
included the type of case (otherwise known as “nature of suit”);35 identity 
of the presiding district judge; involvement (if any) of a magistrate 
judge; number of plaintiff attorneys filing appearances; number of 
defendant attorneys filing appearances; elapsed time between case filing 
and the initial scheduling conference; number of motions on disputed 
discovery;
36
 number of motions brought under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12; number of motions brought under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 56; elapsed time for the court to rule on each such motion; 
whether a hearing was held on each such motion; number of extensions 
or continuances sought and granted; length of each major continuance; 
court-sponsored efforts at alternative dispute resolution; length of trial 
and type of trial (with or without a jury), if any; and appellate history. Of 
the variables present in every case, we found that number of attorneys 
filing an appearance was the most highly correlated with case length with 
very little difference between the correlation of number of plaintiff 
attorneys and case length (r=.31, p-value<.01) and number of defense 
attorneys with case length (r=.29, p-value<.01).  In fact, combining these 
variables into a single measure called ‘total attorneys’ yielded the highest 
correlation (r=.35, p-value<.01).  We decided at the case level we would 
use total attorneys to predict case length. 
It is important to reiterate here that we are measuring the number of 
attorneys who filed an appearance in each case – i.e., those attorneys 
who signed a pleading, appeared for a hearing or conference, or 
otherwise placed themselves on record as representing a party in a case.  
These numbers do not—and indeed cannot—account for those (typically 
 
Perfection, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 833, 876-77 & nn.251, 258 (1994). 
33. See id. at 877 n.252. 
34. See generally Daniel W. Shuman, When Time Does Not Heal, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. 
POL’Y & L. 880 (2000). 
35. We conducted modeling using “nature of suit,” but with over sixty categories 
and with some categories possessing fewer than five cases, too little separation existed to 
create an interpretable multilevel model. 
36. This category includes a range of motions brought when parties are unable to 
resolve discovery-related issues, including motions to compel, motions to quash, and 
motions for discovery sanctions. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/5
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junior) attorneys who are not listed on the case docket but who may 
spend hundreds or thousands of hours on the case outside of the court’s 
direct view. 
Our goal was to predict values for case length based on a function 
of number of attorneys and size of courts. Cases are nested within courts 
and courts can be distinguished by the authorized number of district 
judges. Specifically we sought to determine if courts do differ in 
efficiency based on the number of judges they have been assigned.  
Hierarchical linear modeling is appropriate when data are of a nested 
structure and inferences about the effect of the nesting are desired.
37
  
Four separate models were considered and compared. 
The first model was the ANOVA model which consisted of only the 
dependent variable—case length—and would address the question about 
differences in mean case length based on the court in which a case was 
filed.  The predicted case length model is as follows: 
 
Model 1:  
 
The second model included the Level 2 predictor SIZE which was 
grand mean centered.  As SIZE is not a continuous variable, centering on 
the mean of all sizes will produce a value for SIZE that does not exist in 
the data collected.  It is, however, a useful device for interpreting the 
model results as we can make statements about variation of SIZE above 
the average, below the average or the effect of an average SIZE on the 
model. This model would address the impact of SIZE on the y-intercept 
for the regression equation.  The y-intercept is the value for Case Length 
when the court is of average SIZE. The predicted case length model is as 
follows: 
 
Model 2:  
 
The third model included the Level 2 predictor SIZE which was 
grand mean centered and the case level variable (Level 1) of total 
number of attorneys (TOTALATT).  This model would address the impact 
 
37. See, e.g., BRYK & RAUDENBUSH, HIERARCHICAL LINEAR MODELS (2d ed. 2002); 
EUROPEAN ASS’N OF METHODOLOGY, HANDBOOK OF ADVANCED MULTILEVEL ANALYSIS 
(Joop J. Hox & J. Kyle Roberts eds., 2011); ITA KREFT & JAN DE LEEUW, INTRODUCING 
MULTILEVEL MODELING (2007). 
00 0ij j ijCaseLength r   
00 01 0( )ij j j ijCaseLength SIZE SIZE r       
9
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of SIZE on the y-intercept for the regression equation in the presence of 
the Level 1 predictor variable total number of attorneys, specifically the 
predicted Case Length when the court is of average SIZE and there are 
no attorneys involved.  We model the slope as fixed with no random 
component as the values for number of authorized district judges is fixed 
in the population and fixed in the sample data.  The predicted case length 
model is as follows: 
 
Model 3:    
 
 
 
The fourth and final model includes the Level two predictor SIZE 
which was grand mean centered, the case level variable (Level 1) of total 
number of attorneys (TOTALATT) and an interaction between SIZE and 
TOTALATT.  This model would address the impact of SIZE on the y-
intercept and slope for the regression equation in the presence of the 
Level one predictor variable total number of attorneys.  The predicted 
case length model is as follows: 
 
Model 4:  
 
 
 
 
IV. Results 
Table 1 summarizes the variables used in the analysis at Level 1.  
The average case length for all cases in the study was just over 325 days.  
The average total number of attorneys, including both plaintiff and 
defendant representation, in a given case was 3.7. This number includes 
approximately 1.2% of cases in which neither party has an attorney of 
record. Defense counsel did not file an appearance in approximately 4.8% of 
cases. 
 
 
 
 
00 01 10 0( )ij j ij j ijCaseLength SIZE SIZE TOTALATT r          
00 01 10( )ij j ijCaseLength SIZE SIZE TOTALATT       
11 0( )j ij j ijSIZE SIZE TOTALATT r      
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/5
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics – Level 1 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Level 1 
Total Attorneys 
6753 .00 97.00 3.7072 3.47963 
Case Length 6753 .00 4196.00 325.09 333.98726 
Valid N (listwise) 6753     
 
Table 2 summarizes the variable used at the Level two analysis, 
SIZE. Here we find the total number of observations per court and the 
respective court sizes.  Due to the small number of courts per cluster 
(court size), the results reported in Table 3 are those estimations of fixed 
effects in which the standard errors are not robust. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics – Level 2 
 
Court ID  SIZE 
Cases 
 Valid Missing Total 
 N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Case Length 
Arizona   12 377 100.0% 0 .0% 377 100.0% 
Colorado  7 1902 100.0% 0 .0% 1902 100.0% 
Idaho  2 406 100.0% 0 .0% 406 100.0% 
Missouri Eastern    6 1916 100.0% 0 .0% 1916 100.0% 
Oregon   6 1362 100.0% 0 .0% 1362 100.0% 
Virginia Eastern    11 415 100.0% 0 .0% 415 100.0% 
Wisconsin Western  2 375 100.0% 0 .0% 375 100.0% 
 
Assumptions for linear regression were checked.  The residual 
distributions by size reveal a departure from normality although the plots 
appear relatively normal.  Linear regression is robust with regard to mild 
to moderate departures from normality.
38
  A violation of the assumption 
of homogeneity of variance was detected and this violation is 
 
38. See, e.g., PHILIP BOBKO, CORRELATION AND REGRESSION (2d ed. 2001). 
11
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problematic. The most likely reason for the heterogeneity of the 
variances is the small sample size per court size cluster.  The variances of 
the different courts with respect to case length are not similar enough to 
provide robust measures for linear regression.  While this issue is 
important, we submit these results as preliminary only and in an effort to 
address this problem we ran the data with a fixed value for the variances, 
fixed at the largest variance in the various courts.  We found results that 
were quite consistent with the results produced when the variance was 
random and we report the results with the random variance. 
Table 3 reports the results of the Hierarchical Linear Modeling 
(HLM). Each Model was run separately and statistics were obtained. The 
results will be used to compare the various models for usefulness in 
application. 
Starting with Model 1, the ANOVA model, we determine if HLM is 
appropriate for this data.  If HLM will not provide more meaningful 
results than Ordinary Least Squares Regression we will use the latter due 
to relative ease of interpretation.  The Intraclass Correlation Coefficient 
measures the proportion of variance in case length that is explained at the 
court level instead of the case level.
39
  This value in Model 1 is 0.14; 
sufficiently high to support the use of HLM to address differences in case 
length. 
Model 2 includes the outcome variable of Case Length at Level 1 
and the Level 2 variable SIZE. Here we find that SIZE has little effect on 
the y-intercept (a non-significant coefficient) when no other predictor 
variable is in the model. 
In the Model 3 analysis we add to the Model 2 variables a Level 1 
predictor of Total Attorneys.  We find this last added variable has a 
significant effect on the slope of the regression line.  The coefficient of 
37.03 is significant at the 0.01 level. SIZE continues to be non-significant 
in the model with a current coefficient of 0.007. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39. Id. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/5
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Table 3. HLM Parameter Estimates 
Statistic 
Model 1 
(ANOVA) 
Model 2 
(Level 2 
Only) 
Model 3 
(Level 1&2)   
Model 4 (Level 
1&2,  
Interaction) 
Fixed Effects 
Coefficients – γ00 
322.52** 322.52** 192.38* 192.59* 
Fixed Effects 
Coefficients – γ01 
 .52 .007 -4.59 
Fixed Effects 
Coefficients – γ10 
  37.03** 36.90** 
Fixed Effects 
Coefficients – γ11 
   1.37** 
Random Effects – 
υ0 
129.96** 142.54** 121.17** 122.22** 
Random Effects – r 321.76 321.76 295.28 295.14 
Deviance 97,168 97,159 95,997 95,988 
Number of 
Parameters 
Estimated 
2 2 2 2 
* Significant at .05 
** Significant at .01 
 
Model 4, the final model, contains all the variables in Model 3 plus 
an interaction term between Level 1 Total Attorneys and Level 2 SIZE.  
We find now that SIZE has a significant effect on the slope Total 
Attorneys. The Level 1 intercept (Court Mean Case Length) does not 
vary much as a function of court size but the slope predicting Case 
Length from Total Attorneys does. There is a significant interaction 
effect between SIZE and Total Attorneys. This final model is the best fit 
model and the one we will use for interpretive purposes.  The deviance 
declines with each model presented while the number of parameters 
remains the same.  The reduction of the deviance indicates an 
improvement over the prior model.  A higher deviance indicates a lack of 
fit; the reduction indicates an improved model fit. 
 
 
The Prediction Equation from Model 4 is as follows: 
 
Predicted Case Length = 192.59 – 4.59*SIZE + 36.90*Total 
Attorneys + 1.38*(SIZE*Total Attorneys) 
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Interpreting the coefficients: 
 
 192.59 is the predicted Case Length when the court is of average 
size and no attorneys file an appearance.  The average size here is the 
average of all the court sizes used in the analysis which for this data is 
6.57.  This suggests that a self-represented plaintiff seeking a legal 
remedy against a self-represented (or otherwise unrepresented) defendant 
in an average size United States District Court can expect 
resolution/disposition of the case in just under seven months.
40
 
 –4.59 is the predicted change in the Case Length for a self-
represented individual seeking a legal remedy in an average size United 
States District Court for every one unit increase in size over the average 
size (every one appointed judge over 6.57).  In other words, when no 
attorneys file an appearance, the predicted length of the case will go 
down as the number of judges on the court increases. 
 36.90 is the predicted increase in Case Length for each attorney 
added to a case (on either side of the case) when the size of the court is 
held constant. 
 1.38 is the coefficient for the interaction between SIZE and Total 
Attorneys. Based on the main effect of SIZE and total number of 
attorneys, the larger the court the shorter the case length, and more 
attorneys would lead to longer case lengths.  In addition, in the same 
court, involving more attorneys would further increase the case length 
due to the significant interaction.  Similarly, for two cases with the same 
number of attorneys involved, the one initiated in the smaller court 
would be shorter in length than the one in the larger court, but not as 
much so without this significant interaction.  As SIZE has been grand 
mean centered we can see that the larger than average courts with any 
attorneys involved will find an increase in case length. Conversely, 
smaller than average courts will see a decrease as more attorneys are 
added to the mix.  When the court is greater than average size there is an 
 
40. We recognize that it is the rare federal case in which there are no attorneys of 
record, i.e., both parties are unrepresented. Indeed, fewer than 300 of the cases in the 
study had no attorneys of record. In many of these cases, a self-represented plaintiff 
voluntarily dismissed the action before the defendant had made a first appearance. Some 
of these voluntary dismissals may reflect early private settlements between the parties, 
obviating the need for defendants (and defense counsel) to make a formal appearance 
before the court. 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/5
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additional effect that will increase the case length due to the positive 
interaction coefficient.  For example, if there are nine attorneys total in a 
court that is one unit larger than average the increase in predicted case 
length would be (9*39.90 + 1.38) = 360.48 additional days added to Case 
Length. 
Figure 1 graphs the interaction effect between SIZE and Total 
Attorneys.  We see there is a crossover at approximately three total 
attorneys. 
 
   Figure 1 – HLM plot of total number of attorneys and length of case 
From the graph we see that the smaller the size of the court, starting 
with a SIZE of 2, the greater the y-intercept. This means that when no 
attorneys file an appearance the predicted Case Length decreases as the 
size of the court increases. This relationship holds true up to the point of 
3 attorneys filing an appearance.  However, once the Total Attorneys 
reaches approximately 3, the smaller courts gain an advantage in 
efficiency and have a lower predicted Case Length than the larger courts. 
That is, as the number of attorneys in a case grows, the relative 
efficiency of large and small courts (as measured by overall Case 
Length) inverts. 
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V.     Discussion 
The crossover in efficiency at approximately three total attorneys 
does not readily admit of a clear explanation.  Nevertheless, we offer 
some initial thoughts to interpret this rather surprising result.  Our 
hypotheses below are just that—hypotheses—that would benefit from 
further research. 
We begin with some general observations and assumptions about the 
characteristics of cases with three or fewer total attorneys.  First, these 
cases are much more likely to involve at least one self-represented 
litigant than are cases with four or more total attorneys.  Purely as a 
matter of definition, most cases with one or fewer attorneys listed on the 
docket must involve at least one pro se litigant.
41
  Even many cases with 
two or three attorneys of record, however, may include a self-represented 
party.  It is not hard to imagine, for example, a suit brought by a pro se 
plaintiff against a small business that is represented by two or three 
counsel over the course of litigation.  Second, we assume that cases with 
fewer total attorneys are, on average, smaller in scope and complexity 
than cases with more attorneys.  Clients typically would not choose to 
pay for a large team of attorneys unless the nature of pretrial and trial 
practice was itself burdensome, complex, or time-consuming.
42
 
We also make certain assumptions about the characteristics of cases 
involving four or more attorneys of record.  While cases with many 
attorneys could still involve self-represented litigants, we assume the 
likelihood of such representation diminishes as the total number of 
attorneys increases.  We also assume that a larger number of attorneys is 
associated with some combination of more parties, greater case 
complexity, and geographic dispersal of parties and counsel.  As noted 
above, case complexity can lead to more attorneys of record because a 
larger legal team is needed to prepare for discovery, motion practice, and 
trial.
43
  An increase in parties can lead to more attorneys because each 
 
41. As noted above, the exception is for cases voluntarily dismissed by a 
represented plaintiff after an early negotiated settlement—a settlement which may also 
involve counsel for the defendant.  These dismissals constitute a small but not negligible 
percentage of the overall caseload in this study. 
42. See Howard M. Tollin & Tammy Feman, Litigation Management: What Legal 
Defense Costs Are Reasonable and Necessary?, 63 DEF. COUNS. J. 529, 530 & n.4 (1996) 
(identifying cost-containment tips for insurance company defendants hiring outside 
counsel and listing cases in which large legal teams were deemed necessary to handle 
complex cases). 
43. See, e.g., John K. Setear, The Barrister and the Bomb: The Dynamics of 
Cooperation, Nuclear Deterrence, and Discovery Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 569, 623 n.99 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/5
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new party is entitled to retain its own independent counsel.  While 
related but legally distinct plaintiffs often retain a single counsel or firm 
to represent them, and while separate defendants sometimes enter into 
joint defense agreements, it remains far more typical for civil defendants 
to retain separate counsel.
44
  Finally, the geographic dispersal of counsel 
leads to additional attorneys of record due to a near-universal pro hac 
vice admission practice: if a party’s lead counsel is not already admitted 
to practice in the district where the case is pending (a common 
occurrence for out-of-state parties, especially corporations with national 
counsel), an additional “local counsel” who is admitted in the district is 
required to make an appearance and must be added to the docket on the 
party’s behalf.45 
Any or all of these factors may increase the number of attorneys 
appearing in a given civil case.  However, we postulate that these factors 
are not equally distributed across courts.  More specifically, we assume 
that in larger courts (which frequently encompass metropolitan areas and 
political or financial centers), a larger number of attorneys in a case is 
more likely to be associated with greater case complexity and an 
increased number of parties, whereas in smaller courts (which tend to 
include less populous, and sometimes more rural, areas), a larger number 
of attorneys is more likely attributable to geographic dispersal of the 
parties and the need for additional, local counsel to file an appearance.
46
 
 
(noting that large legal teams may be used to prepare complex cases in a timely manner); 
Ronald J. Tabak, How Law Firms Can Act to Increase the Pro Bono Representation of 
the Poor, 1989 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 87, 96 (1990) (recommending that law firms 
interested in handling complex pro bono cases “assemble a sufficiently large and 
experienced team of attorneys to handle it effectively.”). 
44. See, e.g., Byron G. Stier, Resolving the Class Action Crisis: Mass Tort 
Litigation as Network, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 863, 910-12 (describing the formation of joint 
defense consortia among independent counsel for individual co-defendants). 
45. For a comprehensive overview of federal district court practice regarding 
temporary admissions and requirements for local counsel, see Richard A. Williamson, 
Esq., New York County Lawyers’ Association Report of the Committee on the Federal 
Courts on Pro Hac Vice Admissions to the Federal Courts, 169 F.R.D. 390 (1996). 
46. We base this presumption in part on the federal courts’ own weighted civil 
caseload statistics.  Weighted caseload is a measure of the estimated time that a judge 
will need to devote to a case over its lifetime and, as such, as a proxy for case 
complexity.  For Fiscal Year 2006, corresponding to the last year of data in our study, 
districts with fifteen or more judges averaged 383 weighted civil filings per judge while 
districts with three or fewer judges in that same period averaged 255 weighted filings per 
judge.  See Table X-1A: Weighted and Unweighted Filings per Authorized Judgeship 
During the 12-Month Period Ending September 30, 2006, in JAMES C. DUFF, 2006 
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 
414-17 (2006) [hereinafter JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2006].  This strongly suggests that larger 
17
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With these assumptions and observations in mind, we turn to the 
puzzle presented by our model.  Why would larger courts have a 
comparative efficiency advantage in cases involving fewer attorneys of 
record?  We have already noted that such cases are more likely to include 
at least one pro se litigant, and are also likely to involve fewer parties 
and be less complex.  One possibility is therefore that larger courts have 
more resources—and more flexibility regarding the use of existing 
resources—to devote to the expedient resolution of these types of cases.  
Although we are aware of no research that has directly addressed this 
question, there is some strong circumstantial support for this view.  For 
example, as a group, larger district courts have been shown to allocate 
considerably more time per judge to courtroom hearings than do smaller 
district courts.
47
  Larger district courts also typically have more 
magistrate judges, more staff, and sometimes more physical facilities 
available to attend to issues raised by self-represented litigants.
48
  If, as 
 
courts encountered more complex cases on average than smaller courts. 
47. See Jordan M. Singer & Hon. William G. Young, Measuring Bench Presence: 
Federal District Judges in the Courtroom, 2008-2012, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 243, 264 
fig.3 (2013) (showing that courts with one to two authorized district judges averaged 408 
total courtroom hours per judge per year during Fiscal Years 2008 through 2012, while 
courts with twenty-two or more authorized district judges averaged 528 courtroom hours 
per judge per year during the same period). 
48. A good example of the resource disparity is in the allocation of pro se law 
clerks by district.  These clerks conduct preliminary merit reviews of many pro se civil 
filings and often serve at the forefront of the court’s communication with self-represented 
litigants.  See Pro Se Law Clerks: A Valuable Resource, THE THIRD BRANCH: 
NEWSLETTER OF THE FEDERAL COURTS (April 2011), U.S. COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/news/TheThirdBranch/11-04-
01/Pro_Se_Law_Clerks_A_Valuable_Resource.aspx (last visited March 3, 2014).   
Although pro se clerks focus primarily on prisoner petitions, in many district courts they 
also review non-prisoner filings from self-represented parties.  See id.  In September 
1995, the Judicial Conference of the United States adopted a formula for pro se law clerk 
hiring and allocated one full-time clerk for every 211 prisoner petitions filed in a district.  
See Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States, September 
19, 1995, at 90, U.S. COURTS, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judconf/95-Sep.pdf. 
Under this formula, for the twelve-month period ending September 30, 2006 
(corresponding to the last full reporting year of our study), eleven “large” district courts 
with fifteen or more authorized judges would have been allocated an average of 6.0 pro 
se clerks each, nineteen “medium” courts with six to eight judges an average of 3.2 pro se 
clerks each, and twenty-three “small” courts with one to three judges an average of 0.8 
pro se clerks each.  See Table C-3: Civil Cases Commenced, by Nature of Suit and 
District, During the 12-Month Period Ending September 30, 2006, in JUDICIAL BUSINESS 
2006, supra note 46, at 168-73 (identifying the number of prisoner filings per district 
court); Chronological History of Authorized Judgeships in the U.S. District Courts, U.S. 
COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAndJudgeships/AuthorizedJudgeships/ChronologicalHist
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/5
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the IAALS report suggests, case processing time is best controlled by 
managing the time between events,
49
 the greater availability of judges 
and court staff to address these issues may well lead to better inter-event 
time management.  By contrast, smaller courts may lack the equivalent 
resource flexibility to address such issues, giving larger courts a 
comparative advantage. 
What, then, explains the crossover in efficiency at approximately 
three total attorneys?  Here, we hypothesize that smaller courts have an 
entirely different comparative advantage that more than compensates for 
resource deficiencies as the number of attorneys increases.  That 
comparative advantage is cultural.  Specifically, smaller courts may 
benefit because the local attorneys and judges know each other better. 
Earlier research has shown that repeated interactions between 
attorneys promotes cooperation in litigation,
50
 and that increased 
interactions between any two people promotes both knowledge-based 
trust
51
 and generally positive views of the other person.
52
  Specific 
research on the criminal justice system has further shown that repeated 
interactions between prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, court clerks 
and bailiffs creates a “courthouse community”53 featuring an “organized 
network of relationships, in which each person who acts on [a] case is 
reacting to or anticipating the reactions of others.”54  The civil justice 
system features fewer repeat interactions between and among judges and 
lawyers than does the local criminal justice system, but even in federal 
civil cases, smaller courts (which necessarily have fewer district judges 
and which typically have admitted fewer attorneys to practice) benefit 
from an increased chance that any two local attorneys will have faced 
 
oryOfAuthorizedJudgeshipsIndex.aspx (identifying the number of authorized judgeships 
in each federal district) (last visited March 3, 2014).  Although the data used in our study 
deliberately excluded prisoner cases, the additional resources brought to bear by pro se 
law clerks on non-prisoner litigation suggests a meaningful resource advantage for larger 
courts. 
49. See CIVIL CASE PROCESSING, supra note 6, at 9-10. 
50. See Jason Scott Johnston & Joel Waldfogel, Does Repeat Play Elicit 
Cooperation?  Evidence from Federal Civil Litigation, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 39 (2002). 
51. See Roy J. Lewicki & Barbara Benedict Bunker, Developing and Maintaining 
Trust in Work Relationships, in TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS: FRONTIERS OF THEORY AND 
RESEARCH 114, 121 (Roderick M. Kramer & Tom R. Tyler eds., 1996). 
52. See, e.g., Eliot R. Smith & Elizabeth C. Collins, Contextualizing Person 
Perception: Distributed Social Cognition, 116 PSYCHOL. REV. 343, 354 (2009). 
53. PETER F. NARDULLI ET AL., THE TENOR OF JUSTICE: CRIMINAL COURTS AND THE 
GUILTY PLEA PROCESS 39-41 (1988). 
54. JAMES EISENSTEIN & HERBERT JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL 
ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL COURTS 10 (1977). 
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each other before, or that any given attorney will have already appeared 
before the district judge in a prior case.  These previous interactions 
build familiarity and confidence in others that can help streamline case 
processing.  Put another way, by interacting more frequently with the 
same judges (and the same pool of local lawyers), local attorneys in 
smaller districts are more likely to develop positive views of each other 
and build shared expectations about how the case shall be managed.  The 
comparatively limited number of possible relationship dyads between 
and among the bench and bar in smaller districts may well promote and 
clarify expectations about the substance and procedure of civil cases 
more easily than in larger districts.  Because the frequency of repeated 
interactions in a small district can be orders of magnitude greater than in 
a large district, in cases with many interacting attorneys prior 
expectations and relative familiarity with opposing counsel may more 
than compensate for a larger court’s resource advantage. 
This cultural explanation seems plausible whether the larger number 
of attorneys in a case is due to substantive complexity, a high litigant 
count, or the geographical dispersal of parties.  If the case is complex or 
involves many parties but the counsel are primarily (or exclusively) 
local, the cultural dynamic described above may promote greater 
familiarity and more efficient case processing than in a larger court, 
where repeated interactions between and among bench and bar are bound 
to be less frequent.  If, on the other hand, the larger number of attorneys 
is due to the appearance of local counsel to assist lead counsel from 
outside the district, local counsel’s knowledge of cultural rhythms and 
expectations within the district would still be expected to be transmitted 
to co-counsel as well. 
These are, again, only initial theories to explain a surprising finding.  
Further research would provide a more comprehensive understanding of 
the causes and consequences of this result. 
 
VI.     Conclusion 
Our analysis of approximately 6700 closed civil cases in seven 
federal district courts reveals a surprising relationship between case 
length, court size, and the total number of attorneys filing an appearance 
in a case.  In particular, the predicted case length is longer for smaller 
courts than for larger courts when three or fewer total attorneys file an 
appearance, but shorter for smaller courts when more than three 
attorneys file an appearance.  We suggest that these findings might be 
explained by larger courts’ comparative efficiency advantage in 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/5
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addressing less complex cases (including cases with self-represented 
litigants), and smaller courts’ efficiency advantage in fostering 
expectations about expedient case processing in cases with a larger 
number of attorneys. 
There are limitations to our study, and our findings would benefit 
from further research.  Still, certain tentative observations and a fuller 
research agenda present themselves.  Scholars, for example, may wish to 
examine more closely the relative balance of local and out-of-state 
attorneys in different courts and case types and the associated impact of 
that balance, analyses not permitted by our data set.  Similarly, 
researchers may wish to account for the consequences of judicial 
vacancies on court resources, an issue that did not affect the courts in our 
study (save one) but which has become increasingly pressing in the last 
several years.
55
 
Our findings also offer lessons for judges, court administrators and 
attorneys.  Individual judges and court staff cannot change a court’s size, 
resources, or external legal culture on their own even if they are 
committed to improving case processing efficiency for all case types.  At 
the same time, individual districts might consider adopting practices to 
compensate for relative inefficiency due to court size and attorney count.  
Smaller courts, for example, might explore creative ways to reallocate 
resources to allow claims and defenses of self-represented litigants to be 
addressed more quickly.  Larger courts might explore ways to create a 
“small court feel” that will foster more interactions between particular 
attorneys and judges, or among attorneys.  If further research confirms 
the relationships we identify here, court administrators and Congress 
might also consider ways to reconfigure district courts to improve 
efficiency.  Finally, attorneys should consider their respective roles in 
lessening—or promoting—delay in civil litigation.  While we do not 
advocate for radical changes at this juncture, we do hope that our 
findings will open the door to new research and policy discussions 
designed to advance the larger goal of promoting district court efficiency 
and productivity. 
 
 
55. See Singer & Young, supra note 47, at 257 (describing unfilled vacancies at the 
federal district court level for Fiscal Years 2008 through 2011). 
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